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Case No. 20100522-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Laree Hansen, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction of illegal use or possession of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 
(West Supp. 2009). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did the trial court properly deny Defendant's motion to suppress? 
Standard of Review. "Whether the trial court erred in denying [a] motion to 
suppress is a mixed question of law and fact. [The appellate courts] review the trial 
court's conclusions of law non-deferentially for correctness, and its factual findings 
for clear error." State v. Nimer, 2010 UT App 376, If 5, 672 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 
(citations omitted); see also State v. Harker, 2010 UT 56, If 8, 240 P.3d 780 ("issues 
regarding the constitutionality of arrests and searches present questions of law that 
[the appellate courts] review for correctness/' 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant constitutional provision and statutes are included in 
Addendum A: 
U.S. Const, amend. IV; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-701 (West Supp. 2010) (intoxication); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206 (West Supp. 2010) (criminal trespass). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State filed an information charging Defendant with intoxication, a class C 
misdemeanor; possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor; possession 
of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third degree felony; and possession 
of a controlled substance (marijuana), a class B misdemeanor. Rl-2; see also R5-6 
(probable cause affidavit). Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence. R37-38; 
see also R29-36 (Defendant's memorandum in support of motion); R39-40 (State's 
memorandum in opposition to Defendant's motion). The court set the matter for an 
evidentiary hearing. R49-50. At the hearing, defense counsel stipulated that the 
matter could be resolved without testimony, and the court set it for oral argument. 
C - - - J A i_ 1 . . JL Jf ~C 1 ~ J l 3 L\ J. JL! C~. ~i , ~ — ~ - ~ ~ J . i — sJZ**-*-*.!.* 
LJCC LU. r \ l \JicU d igUi iL f iLL , U.t?itML&£ L.v/LiiLbCx 5lCLlt?L! LLLet L cxLv. xwiv.lb n C i C il^ Jw Ln > .^Ic;j^  u.*.^, 
both parties presented argument, and the trial court denied the motion. R51-52; see 
also R80 (transcript of oral argument hearing). 
Defendant then entered a, guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine, a 
third degree, felony'; reserving the right to appeal the denial of her motion to 
suppress. R53-58 (plea statement); 59-60, The State dismissed, the other counts. Id. 
I he trial court i mposed an indeterminate prison, term,,, not to exceed, five years, 
, _ : ; . ^ a a i ' ^ ^ •. .:. .
 j n t e n c e ^ a i l £ j | x r L p 0 s e d 3 6 i i loi i,,tl is" p roba t io i t,ii i,,,cl,ii d i i i , ,g 
c ,„ 1 80- lay jail term R68-70 
Defendant ti mely appealed. R66. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 '.' 
At about 1:49 a.m. on September 7 2009, Officer Justin Gorman ami Or:-,. ?-
o^'uci rroerer. r^po^d.^: .^ a corny,....:. , : ~ .-ur:,^r\ in progress at an L^jn 
r^i.,/:v r^t ! ] .  -Tv/;~<v: :.. ;\ . / t o e -:\->.i l 
\\ r~ '"'.r^^ in fU^ '*.'• ' ": - --tdmothp"* = - --^^ "• -/set ' br-ii-^--i '":-
was someone inside the house." id. Robert called a second time to report Liai i\* ^  
"unknown males [were] inside the residence trying to kick in the bathroom, door to 
get inside/' Id. He also said that his grandmother was somewhere in the house and 
had told him to lock himse] f in the bathroom Id. . • . 
iiic uiiuLi^ puLcQ racts are set torm in wiricer justm vjorman s Deptemoer /, 
2009 police report, included in the record at R82, attached in Addendum C. 
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When Officer Gorman arrived, he checked around the residence, but found all 
of the doors locked, all of the windows secured, and no sign of forced entry. Id. 
When Officer Froerer arrived, Officer Gorman knocked on the front door. R82:5. 
The home owner, Irene Chavez, answered immediately. Id. She was startled to see 
the officers and asked why they were there. Id. Officer Gorman explained the 
situation. Id. Irene told them that her grandson, Robert, was upstairs taking a 
shower. Id. She invited them inside and took them upstairs where they saw Robert 
exit the bathroom wearing a towel around his waist. Id. Robert said that he had 
heard some noises outside the bathroom door, called for Irene, heard no answer, 
and "started getting scared because of 'all the gang stuff that [had] been going on' 
and thought they were after him." Id. "Robert seemed very strange and kept 
pacing back and forth . . . . " Id. 
As Officer Gorman was speaking to Robert and Irene, "someone started 
banging loudly on the back patio door which scared Irene/' Id. Officer Gorman 
"went to the back door and observed a female individual peering inside through the 
glass door." Id. He opened the door and "the female stepped back and began 
walking around the small deck in quick jerky steps. The female was clutching a 
small black purse tightly to her body and kept looking around jerking her head back 
and forth." Id. Officer Gorman asked what she was doing and she said "she was 
[there] to see Robert." Id. Officer Gorman asked her to sit down on a bench on the 
4 
deck and asked for her name. J d. She said her name was Laree Hansen ""with a 
DOB of 07-01-60." Id. 
Laree, now the defendant in this case, "kept squirming around on the bench 
and could nol Mt ttill, hi leased on her movements ana ^.-r.cVkii, i "iwcn oorman 
oKs»?n »jd thiil "*-»he .ippcuietj I L in inh; hi v Mimeum- limit i llio IIILIIIRMH. i1 ul 
METH." Id. He then asked when she had lasl • i J sed dri igs a nd she said "il • \ * • as a 
while ago." Id. He asked what drugs she was then on, and she stated "she wasn't 
on any drugs." h I. He asked if she had any drugs in her purse, and she 
t.r rnea.atelv stood ,;;;• o;. uie bench and started walking towards the door." J J. 
h :JL _.r\ . : , >L\ icj-gm^'wi L,areeand >uiu( :;oi:, ,nsiaeinenou>-\ v^n t 
down, "but she rushed n;-: - ?% • • • . . • • ;.. *^> . i 
the upstairs bedrooms. [He] followed [her] inside the bedroom and rrv j^ watcnea a^ 
[she] place[d] her purse underneath the bed, "then , , . stood up and acted like 
everything was normal. , . . . ' ] rene was yelling from behind [him] for Laree to get 
c i it :>£ her house ' ' R82:6 Officer Gorman told I aree to get her purse, and Lar°e 
criminal charges against Laree and only wanted Laree out of her hoi lse " I i i Officer 
Froerer and Officer Gorman escorted Laree outside. Id. As she walked, Officer 
Gorman "noticed that she was swaying and couldn't seem to walk straight." Id. 
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"Once outside [Officer Gorman] asked Laree if she had used METH [that day] 
and she . . . admitted she had." Id. Based on her actions and her admission, he 
placed her "under arrest for Public Intoxication for being a danger to herself and 
others." Id. He searched Laree and her purse incident to the arrest and inside her 
purse "found a discolored glass pipe with a bulb on the end of it that, based on [his] 
training and experience as a Police Officer, appeared to be a pipe commonly used to 
smoke METH with." Id. He also found "a small plastic baggy that contained a 
white crystal substance that appeared to be consistent with METH," "another plastic 
baggy that contained a green leafy substance that looked and smelled consistent 
with Marijuana," "[njumerous small plastic baggies with white residue," and "3 
small silver colored spoons that had a white residue on them." Id. 
Officer Gorman transported Laree to the Weber County Jail where he read her 
Miranda rights to her. Id. She agreed to talk to him. Id. She told him that "she and 
Robert [had] smoked METH together a couple of hours [before] at Robert's house." 
Id. She told him that the white crystal substance was methamphetamine, the green 
leafy substance was marijuana, and they belonged to her. Id. She said that she used 
the glass pipe for smoking methamphetamine. Id. She would not say where she got 
the drugs. Id. She then changed her story and said that Robert had planted the 
drugs on her and that they belonged to him. Id. 
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Officer Gorman booked Laree into jail for public intoxication, possession of 
methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. 
Id. He booked the substances and the paraphernalia into evidence. Vhe while 
crystal substance weighed approximately 0.4 grams and the green leafy substance 
\ \ eigl ted approximate!) 1 5 grams. I J I I ie tested the crystal substance with a 
nan oties identification kil v\ hich showed a positive resull for methamph'/tamm*1 
Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress the 
e\ iwca,;, :L .: r^r pur^pdunnq-theseaixn ;ncu. ; ;-..., :iv<. :>j;*,ii\^ c\.L„ r^i^es 
tl ,s - ' ' ' e ^ t i n g o M ^ Pf 1^'s*"jo " ' v . l v ' O i t 1 . *r->-1 u* ci" •-' - r :;, . : ;-"-, 'v •-* ,\ - \ en ' l lv 
"unlawful/' and the search incid--1 -'~ / — - therefo- riy ^ : n nth 
Amendment. Defendant cannci prevail on ihis daim je^ausc the officer had 
probable cause to believe that Defendant had committed or was committing a crime. 
Probable cause justifies an arrest where the facts and circumstances known to 
police "vv ould justify a pr udent person in believing that the suspect has committed, is 
j^ iiQy^ ]^  ,L._ ,j„ arresting otticer were sutticient to warrant a prud ent person's 
believing that Defendant had committed 'intoxication in a public place, intoxication 
in a private place, or criminal trespass. Probable cause to believe that Defendant 
7 
had committed any one of these offenses sufficed to justify the arrest, regardless of 
the officer's subjective reason for making the arrest. 
ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE POLICE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE 
THAT DEFENDANT HAD COMMITTED A CRIME, 
DEFENDANT'S ARREST AND THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO 
ARREST WERE "LAWFUL" UNDER THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 
Defendant first claims that the arresting officer "lacked probable cause to 
effectuate an arrest for public intoxication" or "for trespass" and that the trial court 
consequently erred by denying her motion to suppress. Br. Appellant at 17, 22 
(boldface, capitalization, and underlining omitted). Defendant cannot prevail on 
this claim because the officer had probable cause to arrest her for intoxication in a 
public place, intoxication in a private place, or criminal trespass. Whether he 
believed he had probable cause to arrest her for those offenses is irrelevant to the 
"lawfulness" of the arrest under the Fourth Amendment. 
Relevant law. The admissibility of evidence obtained in a search incident to 
arrest depends upon whether or not the arrest was "lawful" under the Fourth 
Amendment. State v. Harker, 2010 UT 56,119,19,240 P.3d 780. Citing the recent 
United States Supreme Court decision in Vivginia v. hdoove, 553 U.S. 164, 174-48 
(2008), the Utah Supreme Court has clarified that "all the Constitution requires for 
8 
an arrest to be 'lawful7 is for the arrest to be based on probable cause/7 Harker, 2010 
UT 56,119. 
"The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly defined probable cause as 
'facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant 
a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing... that the suspect has 
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.'" Id. at | 20 (quoting 
Michigan v. De Fillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)). "Whether probable cause exists 
depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the 
arresting officer at the time of the arrest." Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146,152 
(2004) (citing Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366,371 (2003)). But, except for the facts 
the officer knows, "an arresting officer's state of mind . . . is irrelevant to the 
existence of probable cause." Id. at 153 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 
812-13 (1996)). "That is to say, [the officer's] subjective reason for making the arrest 
need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable 
cause." Id. (citations omitted). In other words, if probable cause exists to support an 
arrest for some offense, the arrest is "lawful" for Fourth Amendment purposes. See 
id. This is true even if the officer believes the suspect has committed a different 
offense. See id. at 153-55. 
Analysis. The question here is whether the facts and circumstances within 
Officer Gorman's knowledge were sufficient to warrant a prudent person's belief 
9 
that Defendant had committed, was committing, or was about to commit an offense. 
See Harker, 2010 UT 56, ^ 20; see also Michigan v. De Fillippo, 443 U.S. at 37. Here, the 
facts were sufficient to warrant the officer's believing that Defendant had committed 
or was committing three different offenses: (1) intoxication in a public place; (2) 
intoxication in a private place, and (3) criminal trespass. But all that was required to 
establish probable cause was knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficient to 
warrant the officer's believing that Defendant had committed or was committing 
any one of the offenses, whether or not the officer actually believed he was 
committing that offense. 
The intoxication statute. Statutory law provides that "[a] person is guilty of 
intoxication if the person is under the influence of alcohol, a controlled substance, or 
any substance having the property of releasing toxic vapors, to a degree that the 
person may endanger the person or another, in a public place or in a private place 
where the person unreasonably disturbs other persons/7 Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-
701(1) (West Supp. 2010). The Utah Supreme Court has held that the statute thus 
"establishes two different levels of intoxication, depending on whether the 
individual is in a private or public place. Under the public intoxication statute, an 
individual is 'guilty of intoxication'" in a public place if [she] is 'under the influence 
of alcohol [or a controlled substance] . . . to a degree that [she] may endanger 
[herself] or another." Due South v. Deft of Alcoholic Beverages, 2008 UT 71, \ 33,197 
10 
P.3d 82 (footnote omitted). She is "'guilty of intoxication' in a private place if [she] 
is 'under the influence of alcohol [or a controlled substance] . . . to a degree that 
[she]... unreasonably disturbs other persons/" Id. (footnote omitted); see also State 
v. Henderson, 2007 UT App 125, t 11, 159 P.3d 576 (stating that legislature 
distinguished between intoxication in public places and intoxication in private 
places). 
Intoxication in a public place. Here, the facts and circumstances in Officer 
Gorman's knowledge were sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that Defendant 
had committed or was committing intoxication in a public place. Based on the 
undisputed evidence, the officer saw Defendant outside the patio door of Irene 
Chavez's home, "walking around the small deck in quick jerky steps," "clutching a 
small black purse tightly to her body," and "looking around jerking her head back 
and forth." R82:5. After Officer Gorman asked her to sit down, she "kept squirming 
around on the bench and could not sit still." Id. She "appeared to be acting like 
someone under the influence of [methamphetamine]." Id. Her conduct was erratic. 
When asked whether she had any drugs in her purse, she "immediately stood up off 
the bench and started walking towards the door." Id. Moreover, even though Irene 
yelled from inside that she did not want Defendant anywhere around her house, 
and even though the officer asked Defendant to sit back down, Defendant "pushed 
past [the officer] and ran into the house heading inside of one of the upstairs 
11 
bedrooms," where she placed her purse under the bed and then "stood up and acted 
like everything was normal/" Id. "[S]he was swaying and couldn't seem to walk 
straight." R82:6. Then, after being escorted out of the home but before being 
arrested, Defendant admitted that she had used methamphetamine that day. Id. 
Under these circumstances, the Officer had probable cause to believe that 
Defendant was intoxicated to a degree where she might endanger herself or another. 
Her movements suggested she was under the influence of methamphetamine. She 
ignored the direction of others, acted irrationally, and her movements were jerky 
and apparently uncontrolled. Under these circumstances, the officer had probable 
cause to believe that she might trip and fall on the stairs coming down from the 
deck or somewhere else, injuring herself, or walk into or trip someone else, injuring 
the other person. 
Moreover, the officer had probable cause to believe that she had committed, 
was committing, or was about to commit intoxication in a public place. The officer 
was justified in believing that Defendant was either in a public place when on the 
deck outside Irene Chavez's home or had been in a public place just before stepping 
off any public access to the home and that she was under the influence of 
methamphetamine to a degree where she might endanger herself or others at that 
time. 
12 
Intoxication in a private place. In addition or alternatively, the facts and 
circumstances known to Officer Gorman sufficed to warrant a reasonable belief that 
Defendant had committed or was committing intoxication in a private place. As 
explained above, the facts justified a belief that Defendant was under the influence 
of methamphetamine. Moreover, they justified a belief that she was under the 
influence to a degree that she unreasonably disturbed others. Defendant, in fact, 
entered Irene Chavez's residence without permission and despite Irene's yelling out 
that she did not want Defendant anywhere around her house. R82:5. Moreover, 
Defendant was not amenable to persuasion. After Irene yelled out that she did not 
want Defendant anywhere around her house, Officer Gorman asked Defendant to 
sit back down, but Defendant instead "pushed past [him] and ran into the house 
heading inside to one of the upstairs bedrooms. [He] followed [her] inside the 
bedroom and [he] watched as [she] place[d] her purse underneath the bed, then. . . 
stood up and acted like everything was normal/' Id. In fact, Officer Gorman and 
Officer Froerer had to escort her out of the home. Id. All of this provided probable 
cause to believe that she was intoxicated to such a degree that she unreasonably 
disturbed others. Finally, the disturbance took place in a private place—inside Irene 
Chavez's home. 
Trespass. Defendant further argues that the facts and circumstances known 
to the officer did not warrant a belief that she had committed or was committing 
13 
criminal trespass. See Br. Appellant at 22. She argues that "the officer did not see a 
factual basis at the time to arrest her for trespass or he certainly would have arrested 
her for it." Id. But, as explained above, the officer's subjective belief about whether 
he had probable cause to arrest her for trespass is not determinative. See Devenport, 
543 U.S. at 152-55. Rather, the determinative question is whether the objective facts 
and circumstances known to him sufficed to establish probable cause. See id. Here, 
those facts and circumstances warranted a belief that Defendant had committed or 
was committing criminal trespass. 
A person commits criminal trespass when "knowing [her] entry or presence is 
unlawful, the person enters or remains on property as to which notice against 
entering is given by . . . personal communication to the actor by the owner . . . ." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(2)(b) (WestSupp. 2010). Here, Defendant both entered 
and remained on the property after Irene Chavez, the owner, had yelled from inside 
the house, "I don't want her anywhere around my house." R82:5. Moreover, as 
Officer Gorman was following Defendant inside the bedroom and watching her 
place her purse beneath the bed, "Irene was yelling from behind [him] for 
[Defendant] to get out of her house." R82:6. The facts and circumstances thus 
sufficed to warrant a reasonable belief that Defendant had entered and remained in 
the house after Irene had personally communicated to her that she should not enter. 
Defendant thereby knew that her entry into and remaining within the home were 
14 
unlawful, and consequently there was probable cause to believe that Defendant had 
committed and was committing criminal trespass. 
Defendant argues that "Irene subsequently revoked any sort of trespassory 
interest when she told the officer that she did not want to pursue charges against 
[Defendant]/' Br. Appellant at 24. Defendant claims, without citing any support, 
that "if an owner tells the police that she does not want a person charged for 
trespass, then she has communicated her intent to revoke her trespassory interest in 
the property/' Br. Appellant at 24. But Irene never withdrew her demand that 
Defendant stay out of her house. Irene merely indicated that she did not want to 
press charges. R82:6. Whether Irene did or did not want to press charges was 
irrelevant to whether the officer had probable cause to believe that Defendant had 
committed or was committing criminal trespass. Cf. State v. Miner, 2006 WL 
2406246, *2 (Minn. App. 2006) (unpublished) (attached in Addendum B) (under 
totality of the circumstances, person of ordinary care and prudence would entertain 
honest and strong suspicion that defendant was involved in felony car theft giving 
rise to probable cause for arrest; fact that complaining witness later declined to press 
charges irrelevant to circumstances that existed at time of arrest). 
Thus, if the circumstances sufficed to warrant Officer Gorman's belief that 
Defendant had committed or was committing intoxication in a public place, 
15 
intoxication in a private place, or criminal trespass, they sufficed to support his 
arrest of Defendant. 
Defendant's only challenge to the admissibility of evidence of the search at 
trial was his claim that the officer lacked probable cause for arrest. Where the 
evidence demonstrates that the officer had probable cause, Defendant cannot show 
that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted January £$, 2011. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
^E B. INOUYE O 
tant Attorney General 
sel for Appellee 
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Addenda 
Addenda 
Addendum A 
Addendum A 
U.S. Const, amend IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
76-9-701. Intoxication — Release of arrested person or placement in 
detoxification center. 
(1) A person is guilty of intoxication if the person is under the influence of 
alcohol, a controlled substance, or any substance having the property of releasing 
toxic vapors, to a degree that the person may endanger the person or another, in a 
public place or in a private place where the person unreasonably disturbs other 
persons. 
(2) (a) A peace officer or a magistrate may release from custody a person 
arrested under this section if the peace officer or magistrate believes imprisonment 
is unnecessary for the protection of the person or another. 
(b) A peace officer may take the arrested person to a detoxification center or 
other special facility as an alternative to incarceration or release from custody. 
(3) If a minor is found by a court to have violated this section and the violation 
is the minor's second or subsequent violation of this section, the court: 
(a) shall order the minor to participate in an educational series as defined in 
Section 41-6a-501; and 
(b) may order the minor to participate in a screening as defined in Section 41-
6a-501. 
(4) (a) When a minor who is at least 18 years old, but younger than 21 years 
old, is found by a court to have violated this section, the court hearing the case 
shall suspend the minor's driving privileges under Section 53-3-219. 
(b) Notwithstanding the requirement in Subsection (4)(a), the court may reduce 
the suspension period required under Section 53-3-219 if: 
(i) the violation is the minor's first violation of this section; and 
(ii) the minor completes an educational series as defined in Section 41-6a-501. 
(5) When a person who is at least 13 years old, but younger than 18 years old, 
is found by a court to have violated this section, the provisions regarding 
suspension of the driver's license under Section 78A-6-606 apply to the violation. 
(6) When the court issues an order suspending a person's driving privileges for 
a violation of this section, the person's driver license shall be suspended under 
Section 53-3-219. 
(7) An offense under this section is a class C misdemeanor. 
Amended by Chapter 390, 2009 General Session 
76-6-206. Criminal trespass. 
(1) As used in this section, "enter" means intrusion of the entire body. 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances not 
amounting to burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204 or a 
violation of Section 76-10-2402 regarding commercial obstruction: 
(a) the person enters or remains unlawfully on property and: 
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to any 
property, including the use of graffiti as defined in Section 76-6-107; 
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; or 
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the safety of 
another; 
(b) knowing the person's entry or presence is unlawful, the person enters or 
remains on property as to which notice against entering is given by: 
(i) personal communication to the actor by the owner or someone with apparent 
authority to act for the owner; 
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude intruders; or 
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders; or 
(c) the person enters a condominium unit in violation of Subsection 57-8-7(7). 
(3) (a) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) or (b) is a class B misdemeanor unless it 
was committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a class A misdemeanor. 
(b) A violation of Subsection (2)(c) is an infraction. 
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that: 
(a) the property was open to the public when the actor entered or remained; and 
(b) the actor's conduct did not substantially interfere with the owner's use of the 
property. 
Amended by Chapter 334, 2010 General Session 
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UNPUBLISHED OPINION 
STONEBURNER, Judge. 
*1 The state appeals an order suppressing evi-
dence, arguing that seizure of a "crack pipe" was 
valid under the "plain feel" exception and that the 
search that led to discovery of the pipe was also justi-
fied as incident to arrest. Because the record supports 
the validity of the search and seizure of the pipe as 
incident to arrest, we reverse and remand. 
FACTS 
Near midnight, Jordan police officers received a 
dispatch reporting a motor-vehicle theft in progress. 
The dispatcher stated that the stolen vehicle was a 
black Volkswagen Golf driven by Kevin Dugal and 
that respondent Deanna Lea Miner was involved in 
the theft and was following Dugal in a rusty Chevro-
let Suburban. The dispatcher also stated that Dugal 
and Miner had been using crack all day. 
Within approximately 15 minutes after receiving 
this dispatch, police officer Brian Stolt located the 
Golf and the rusty Suburban parked on the side of the 
road. Dugal was standing by the Suburban, and 
Miner was in the Golf. Stolt drew his handgun and 
ordered Dugal and Miner away from the vehicles and 
onto their knees. Dugal and Miner complied. 
Officer John Wamsley arrived and pat-searched 
Miner's outer clothing for officer safety. Wamsley 
felt an object that he later testified he immediately 
recognized as "consistent with" an illegal-narcotics 
pipe. Wamsley seized the pipe, which had a Brillo 
pad inside it with what appeared to be controlled-
substance residue. Subsequent testing of the pipe and 
Brillo pad revealed a trace amount of cocaine. Miner 
was taken into custody and subsequently charged 
with controlled-substance crime in the fifth degree 
and petty misdemeanor possession of drug parapher-
nalia. After the arrest, the complaining witness, 
Dugal's daughter, declined to press charges. 
The district court granted Miner's motion to sup-
press evidence of the pipe, concluding that although 
there was reasonable suspicion for a patdown for 
weapons, discovery of the pipe went beyond the 
scope of a weapons search. The district court found 
that there was no evidence of suspicion that Miner 
was under the influence of a controlled substance or 
in control of a vehicle, that Wamsley "did not testify 
as to his immediate recognition of this item as being 
illegal contraband," and that the totality of the cir-
cumstances would not support a "strong and honest 
suspicion" that Miner had committed a crime. This 
appeal by the state followed. 
DECISION 
On appeal from a pretrial suppression order, the 
state must show that the suppression order will have a 
critical impact on the state's ability to prosecute the 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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defendant and that the order constituted error. State v. 
McGrath 706 N.W.2d 532, 538-39 
(Minn.App.2005), review denied (Minn. Feb. 22, 
2006). It is not disputed that suppression of the evi-
dence precludes the state from being able to convict 
Miner of the charges against her; therefore, the state 
has met the critical-impact test. 
"Where the facts are not in dispute, the issue of 
whether the district court's pretrial order is erroneous 
is a question of law, subject to de novo review." 
State v. Volkman, 675 N.W.2d 337. 341 
(Minn.App.2004). "A search incident to arrest is 
valid by itself and does not require any additional 
justification." State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886, 
892 (Minn. 1998) (citing United States v. Robinson. 
414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477 (1973)). "The 
search 'incident' to arrest has been extended to in-
clude a search 'precedent' to arrest if the officer has 
probable cause to arrest at the time of the search." 
State v. Bauman, 586 N.W.2d 416, 420 
(Minn.App. 1998), review denied (Minn. Jan. 27, 
1999). In Bauman, we stated that a more descriptive 
name for such a search is "search incident to probable 
cause to arrest" because "[t]he focus is not on the 
arrest, but on whether probable cause to arrest exists 
before a search." Id. at 421. 
*2 In this case, the district court erred by con-
cluding that the totality of the circumstances did not 
provide probable cause to believe that Miner had 
committed a crime. 
[Courts] apply an objective standard for determin-
ing the lawfulness of an arrest or a search by taking 
into account the totality of the circumstances to de-
termine whether the police have probable cause to 
believe that a crime has been committed, and if the 
objective standard is met, we will not suppress evi-
dence or invalidate an arrest even if the officer 
making the arrest or conducting the search based 
his or her action on the wrong ground or had an, 
improper motive. 
Statp v Perkins 582 N.W.2d 876. 878 
(Minn. 1998) (quotation omitted). 
"The test of probable cause to arrest is whether 
the objective facts are such that under the circum-
stances a person of ordinary care and prudence would 
entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a crime 
has been committed." State v. Kier, 678 N.W.2d 
672, 678 (Minn.App.2004) (quotation omitted). The 
police officers knew from dispatch that there was a 
report that (1) Dugal had stolen a VW Golf; (2) 
Miner was involved; (3) Dugal was driving the VW, 
and Miner was driving a rusty Suburban; and (4) both 
had been using crack all day. When Stolt located the 
vehicles, Miner was sitting in the stolen car. 
Under the totality of the circumstances, a person 
of ordinary care and prudence could entertain an 
honest and strong suspicion that Miner was involved 
in felony car theft giving rise to probable cause for 
arrest. The fact that the complaining witness later 
declined to press charges and did not directly tell the 
officers, when they interviewed her after the arrest, 
that Miner was involved in the theft is irrelevant to 
the circumstances that existed at the time of the ar-
rest. The audio recording of the complaining wit-
ness's 911 call is largely unintelligible, but several 
times the complaining witness uses the pronoun 
"they," and she can be heard giving Miner's name 
and the description of the Suburban. It is undisputed 
that the dispatcher told the officers that Miner was 
involved in the theft. The district court erred by sup-
pressing evidence seized incident to a lawful arrest. 
Because we conclude that the search and seizure 
was justified as incident to arrest, we do not reach the 
state's argument that the search and seizure was also 
justified under the "plain feel" doctrine. 
Reversed. 
Minn.App.,2006. 
State v. Miner 
Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2006 WL 2406246 
(Minn.App.) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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OGDEN POLICE DEPARTMENT 
GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOPY 
GO OG 2009-70165 (CLOSED/ARRES) 3572 - 0 DRUG-AMPHETAMINE POSSESS 
A 
General Offense Information 
Operational status • CLOSED/ARREST/BOOKED 
Reported on ; Sep-07-2009 (Mon.) 0147 
Occurred on . Sep-07-2l>09 (Mon.) 0147 
Approved on : Sep-07-2009 (Mon.) by : 532 - Sangbcrg, Scott 
Report submitted by : 846 - Gorman,G Justin 
Org unit: Uniform Squad 4 
Down time : 234 
Location . 627 CANYON MEW DR 
Municipality : OGDEN County : Weber Counrv 
District: 0 2 Beat: 41 Grid : LIN/ED 
Felony-Misdemeanor: F 
Bias : None (no bias) 
Gang involvement: No 
Family violence: NO 
Offenses (Completed/Attempted) 
Offense : #1 3572 - 0 DRUG-AMPHETAMINE POSSESS - COMPLETED 
Location : Residenee/Home , ci \ 
Offender suspected of using : None _ *C* ' 
Criminal activity : Possessing/Concealing , \-^^xS"".
 r ^ 
. ' O ^ ^ 
Offense : #2 3562 - 0 DRUG-MARIJUANA POSSESS - COMPLETED
 v ' ; ; V:" ' . .M\\" 
Location: Residence/Home ^\ * .^ / ; > -\ 
Offender suspected of using • None ,c\^' *~- \ ' ' ~ .,c, "-1 
Criminal activity.: Possessing/Concealing y 0 - " JTJ>*
 t _ ^ i ~ ~ * - o S ^ ^ A 
Offense . #3 7399 - 26 PUB ORD-PUBLIC INTOXICATION - COMHUETE^A ^ \.^f\ ^ ' ^ 0 *' ^ ' 
Location : Residence/Home *"
 r ^ \ £ ^ w > «£/,-'^~ 
Offender suspected of using : None .
 r \ 0^x ^c« & 
Offense : #4 3550 - 0 DRUG-NARCOTIC EQUIPMENT POSSES - COMPLETED 
Location : Residence/Home 
Offender suspected of using : None 
Criminal activity : Possessing/Concealing 
Offense ; #5 359B - 0 T-CASE - COMPLETED 
Location ' Residence/Home 
Offender suspected of using , None 
Related Event(s) 
CP OG 2009-70165 
AB OG 2009-9993 
Related Person(s) 
Arrestee #1: HANSEN, LAREE CHRISTENSEN 
(Case Specific Information) 
Sex : FEMALE 
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Race : Caucasian/White 
Ethnicity; Non-Hispanic 
Date of birth : JuI-01-1960 
Address : 925 E 1100 N , OGDEN . Utah 84401 
Phone Numbers: Home : (801)782-9335 
Occupation: NONE 
Marital status: Divorced 
Language(s) spoken: English ?UPSUBDt tO ( J R C r ? Pit* a 1Rfa\ 
Disability: Drug/Akohol Addiction , ,J M - ^ • : ' i 0 ^ e J 
Height:5'06 ^ o ULA 3 77-33-6, the victimCs) 
2 3 8 ^ ! i V . / n d witnesses' identifying '' 
Build : Medium Fra 'HTOrmatfOP P 3 S b ^ n rf=>ciort&r\ 
Hair color: Brown c r _ _ ,. -; XJ^Li " U - L i e a 
Hair style: Long r [ u m u ^ S H C i O S e d d o c u m e n t s . 
Eye color: Blue 
Facial hair: Ncme 
Additional remarks: 
CELL 725-2670, ALSO USES CHRISTENSEN AS LAST NAME 
Master Name Index Reference 
Arrestee #1: HANSEN, LAREE CHRISTENSEN 
Sex: FEMALE 
Race : Caucasian/White 
Ethnicity: Non-Hispanic 
Date of birth : JuMJl-1960 
Linkage factors 
Resident status: Resident 
Condition: Consumed Drugs 
Offense : 2204 - 0 BURG-NO FORCE ENTRY RESIDENCE - COMPLETED 
Arrest date : Sep~07-2009 (Mon.) 
Arrest type : Arrest/Booked-Chg Only 
Armed with : Not Applicable 
Charge Summary 
Charge # 1 
Offense dare : Sep-07-2009 (Mon.) 0220 
Offense : Pub Ord-Public Intoxication - COMPLETED 
Charge statute : MD 76-9-701 
Charge count. I 
Charge severity: 
Related to General Offense# : OG 2009-70165 
Charge # 2 
Offense date : Sep-07-2009 (Mon,) 0220 
Offense : Drug-Amphetamine Possess - COMPLETED 
Charge statute : FE 58-37-8-MA 
Chars? count: 1 
Charee severity': 
Related to General Offense# : OG 2009-70165 
Charge # 3 
Offense date : Sep-07-2009 (Mon.) 0220 
Offense : Drug-Marijuana Possess - COMPLETED 
Charee statute • MD 58-37-8 
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Charge count: 1 
Charge seventy: 
Related to General Offense# : OG 2009-70165 
Charge # 4 
Offense date : Sep-07-2009 (Moa.) 022D 
Offense : Drug-Narcotic Equipment Possess - COMPLETED 
Charge statute : MD 5S-37A-5 
Charge count: 1 
Charge seventy: 
Related to General Offense# : OG 2009-70165 
Complainant #1; SOTO, ROBERT JR JR 
(Case Specific Information) 
Linkage factors 
Resident status: Resident 
Property Ow #1: CHAVEZ, IRENE GARCIA ZAMORA 
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(Case Specific Information) 
Se: 
Ra 
EthnT 
Date of 
Addre: 
Phone fv 
Place of 
Occupat 
Employer 
Marital s ' 
Languagi 
Citizensh": 
Disabi 
Heiahi 
WefJ 
Com] 
BuiL 
Hair 
Hair 
Eyeo 
Han, 
Master Name Index Reference 
Property Ow #1: CHAVEZ, IRENE GARCIA ZAMORA 
Sef 
Ra 
Et! 
Date< 
Linkage factors 
Resident status : Resident 
Related text page(s) 
Document: INITIAL R/O FIELD 
Author: 84 5 - Gorman,0 Justin 
Related date'/time: Sep-07-2009 0403 
i\ 
On 09-07-2009: at 0149 hours Officer Froerer and I were dispatched on a 
burglary in progress complaint at 627 Canyon View DR. 
The complainant, Robert Sotor reported to Dispatch that he was hiding in 
the bathroom pf his grandmother's house because he believed there was 
someone insid'e the house. Robert kept hanging up and calling Dispatch 
back, reporting that he now saw 2 unknown males inside the residence trying 
to kick in the bathroom door to gee inside. 
Robert also said his grandmother is somewhere in the house and that siie was 
the one who told him to lock himself in the bathroom, 
1 arrived checking around the residence finding all of the doors locked and 
all of the windows secured. No sign of forced entry was observed. I tried 
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to listen inside but I could not hear any noise inside. When Ofticer 
Froerer arrived I knocked on the front door and it was answered immediately 
by the home owner, Irene Chavez. 
Irene was startled when she saw us at the door and asked what was wrong. I 
asked Irene what was going on inside the home and she told me "nothing is 
going on, why are you guys here". 
I explained the situation to Irene and she told me that her grandson, 
Robert, was upstairs taking a shower. Irene invited us inside and escorted 
us upstairs where a male individual exited an upstairs bathroom wearing a 
towel around his waist. 
The male stated his name was Robert Soto and he began explaining what had 
happened. Robert said he was in the bathroom and thought Irene had gone to 
sleep for the night. Robert stated he heard some noises outside the 
bathroom door so he called for Irene but he didn't hear her answer him. 
Robert statedhe started getting scared because of "all the gang stuff that 
been going on" and thought they were after him* 
Robert seemed,very strange and kept pacing back and forth as he talked. I 
asked Robert if he was in a gang or on drugs and he said no. Irene told me 
that she never went to sleep and was up walking around the house which was 
what Robert had heard. 
As I was speaking to Robert and Irene someone started banging loudly on the 
back patio*door which scared Irene. Irene stated she thinks someone was 
really trying'to break in now. 
I went to the back door and observed a female individual peering in&iers .rx 
through the glass door. I opened the door and the female step^^©ack^!teS' 
began walking around the small deck in quick jerky steps. Thex^fem&pe^ was 
clutching a small black purse tightly to her body and kegt^!6okin& afrooja£ (\ jerking her head back and forth.
 % X^ ^ > / ^ v\w ' .•*£ 
I asked the female what she was doing and she said, she-^as ""hera vtp^see ^-J^ 
Robert. I asked the female to sit down on a bercipK^thaS wajpcfn^t&jj^a^ejfc*4and 
asked her for her name. The female stated h ^ ^ W m ' e y w ^ ^ ^ a r e e ^ ^ a ^ e j ^ with a 
DOB of 07-01-50. ' o.^ ^ ^ s\^>y -Z^ 
Lares kept squirming around on the bench and could j^Qtr^sicSstill. Based on 
Laree's movements and behavior, I observed that she"* appeared to be acting 
like someone under the influence of METH. ',C\?KS 
_, <\ v«* 
I asked Laree when the last time she used drugs was and she said it was a 
while ago. I asked Laree what drugs she was on right now and she stated 
she wasn't on any drugs. I asked Laree if she had any drugs in her purse 
and Laree immediately stood up off of the bench and scarted walking towards 
the door. 
Irene apparently recognized Laree and yelled from inside the house RI don't 
want her anywhere around my house". I asked Laree to sit back down but she 
pushed past me and ran into the house heading ir.side to one of the upstairs 
bedrooms. I followed Laree inside the bedroom and I watched as Laree place 
her purse underneath the bed, then she stood up and acted like everything 
was normal« 
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Irene was yelling from behind me for Laree to get out of her house so I 
told Laree to get her purse. Laree picked up her purse from under the bed. 
Irene said she didn't want to pursue criminal charges against Laree and 
only wanted Laree out of her house» Officer Froerer and I escorted Laree 
outside. As Laree walked I noticed that she was swaying and couldn't seem 
to walk straight. 
Once outside I asked Laree if she had used METH today and she said admitted 
she had. Based on Lareers actions and her admission of being under the 
influence of METH I placed Laree under arrest for Public Intoxication for 
being a danger to herself and others. 
I searched Laree and her purse incident to arrest and inside Laree's purse 
was a small black wallet sized case with a zipper on it. I opened the case 
and found a discolored glass pipe with a bulb on the end of it that, based 
on my training and experience as a Police Officer, appeared to be a pipe 
commonly used to smoke METH with. 
There was also a small plastic baggy that contained a white crystal 
substance that appeared to be consistent with METH, and another plastic 
baggy that contained a green leafy substance that looked and smelled 
consistent with Marijuana. 
Numerous small plastic baggies with white residue where also found inside 
the case along with 3 small silver colored spoons that had a white residue 
on them. 
I transported Laree to the Weber County Jail where I read Laree her Miranda 
Rights, Laree agreed to speak with me and told me that she and Robert 
smoked METH together a couple of hours ago at Robert's house, 
Laree told me the white crystal substance was METH and the green leafy 
substance was Marijuana which were hers. Laree stated that she used the 
glass pipe to smoke METH with. 
I questioned Laree about where she obtained the drugs from but she would 
not say, Laree then changed her story and said that Robert is the one who 
planted the drugs on her and that they belong to him. 
I booked Laree into Jail for Public Intoxication, Possession of METH, 
Possession of Marijuana, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. 
I booked the black zase, tne glass pipe, the plastic baggies, the spoons, 
the white crystal substance, and the green leafy substance into Evidence. 
The white crystal substance weighed approximately 0.4 grams and the green 
leafy substance weighed approximately 1.5 grams, 
I tested the crystal substance with a Narcotic Identification Kit (NIK) 
which showed a positive result for METH, 
All related paperwork was turned into cSLacprdSp^  &p\ ^r-ther getipn^taken. 
and UCA §77-35-6, ihe victim(s) 
and witnesses' identifying 
r f f. information hss been redacted 
Clearance Information , ^-~>^^^u 
tfOiTl t h e enc i '~^ . - . i ^ n r - n r n a n ^ < w i H. W . 
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General Information 
Agency : Ogden 
Cleared status : Arrest/Booked & Citations 
Cleared on Sep-(l7-2009 (Mon.) Complainant/Victim notified: NO 
,GAS> 
«-* x 
Related Arrest Report: AB# OG 2009-9993 .-. v& s \
 r*A~>) 
Arrestee: HANSEN, LAREE CHRISTENSEN 
Date of birth : JuM>l-1960 
Arrest Information ^ ~ < \ '• - r * , wc. i"^ - XO*0^~ r ^ ' ^ ?&:^\<^£A°^ Status: CHARGED * o ' ^-V>; „ ;o-
Type of arrest; Arrest/Rooked-Chg Only • ^ 0 ^ " V ^ >- ?S^" 
Reason for arresf * Other V^' ^ ^~& % 
Arrest date : Sep-07-2009 (Mon.) 0220 ^ 0 ^ k " 
Arrest agency : Ogden City Police 
.Arresting officers : 846 - Gorman,G Justin 
Summary of facts: 
Uf 15009707,PUB INTOX,POSS METH,POSS MARIJPOSS PARA 
Arrest Location 
Address : 70165 CANYON VIEW RD 
Municipality : OGDEN County : Weber Count)' 
Additional Arrest Information 
Case screened: NO 
Notify Victim on release: NO 
Juvenile : NO . 
Armed with : Not Applicable 
Diversion recommended : NO 
Interpreter needed : NO 
Rights given: NO 
Marital status . Divorced 
Mental exam required : NO 
Statement taken : NO 
Fingerprinted : NO Photo taken : NO 
CD updated ; NO 
Family notified : NO by 
Lawyer called : NO Meal given : NO Coffee given : NO 
Arrestee's occupation *. NONE 
Detained. NO 
Arrestee's occupation . NONE 
Reified General Offense report(s) 
OG 2009-701^5 
Related CT)# 
13745 
** END OF HARDCOPY ** 
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